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Pain and suffering in football: analysis of football-related  
fatalities in Brazil
Abstract
In this article we aimed to describe and analyze the extent and nature of deaths related to the football 
spectacle in Brazil. So, we used and crossed data from different sources – field journals, academic books, 
reports from the Ministry of Justice and websites of security associations and of major Brazilian magazines 
and newspapers. We conclude that the geographic distribution of these deaths are directly related to the 
“weight” of each Brazilian region. We also observed that most of these deaths are originated in clashes 
between fans and in conflicts with the police, caused by the adoption of reactive and repressive strategies 
by the police. Furthermore, we point out that many of the deaths occurred outside stadiums and involved 
the use of firearms, as a result of the easy access to these weapons and possibly by a change of attitude of 
the most violent groups about their use.
Keywords: Violence; Football; Deaths; Torcidas organizadas.
Introduction
Long and slow queues to enter football stadia. 
Filthy restrooms. Tickets with abusive prices, 
which decreases the attendance of poor fans. 
Uninformed and truculent cops. Matches held at 
inappropriate times, which finish when there is 
practically no more public transportation to get 
home. Exchange of threats between rival groups. 
Biased chants. Prohibitions that restrict parties in 
the stands. Football-related violence in Brazil, as 
well as in several other countries, should certainly 
be conjugated in the plural. These are violence facts. 
After all, several details in such spectacle may be 
considered violent, even though some of them are 
not perceived as such anymore, since we are already 
so used to them1. However, although we recognize 
that we cannot lose sight of the violent character of 
many situations experienced in football, we opted 
here not to extend the scope of our work and focus 
only on a specific type of violence: the physical one. 
Violence that, in the context of football, includes 
mostly body fights, stone throwing and gunfire2-4.
The most painful, visible and extreme side of 
this violence is certainly felt with the deaths caused 
by it. Nevertheless, such deaths obviously do not 
represent the only variable that must be considered 
to understand it1. After all, situations of physical 
violence do not frequently result in death. A proof 
of this is that the first report of death in Brazil dates 
back to 1967, as we will see later on. But there are 
several records of physical violence between fans 
before that5. However, even if mortality rates are 
not the only variable to consider, they do not cease 
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to function as a key barometer of the problem. 
Barometer that, if placed alongside other data and 
studies6-17 can help us build a valuable diagnostic 
of such a situation. Diagnosis that, in turn, is 
critical to question and review the current security 
policies adopted in the country and to create new 
programs and projects for the prevention of violence 
in Brazilian football.
However, despite the importance of producing 
and analysing statistical data on deaths involving 
football fans in Brazil, the scientific field seems not 
to have taken charge of this task. Unfortunately, 
until now, studies carried out about this matter 
are scarcea. Consequently, we are witnessing a real 
“dance of numbers” in the public debate on this 
subject, which move by the rhythm of the interests 
and purposes of people who propose them. Due to 
the void left in this field, public authorities, sports 
leaders and journalists have assumed the mission 
of elaborating and explaining such data, presenting 
mostly very inaccurate and clearly biased analyses, 
which certainly do not help to solve the problem6. 
Thus, in this study, we decided to assume the task 
above mentioned. More precisely, we sought to 
describe and analyse the extent and the nature of 
deaths related to the football scene in Brazil.
To do that, we structured the paper in five sections: 
in the first one, we briefly contextualized the violence 
related to such a spectacle; in the second one, we 
weaved some methodological considerations; in the 
third one, we discussed the historical development 
and the geographical distribution of the deaths 
reported; in the fourth one, we addressed the social 
actors involved in the deaths; finally, in the fifth part, 
we focused on the places where they happened and 
the weapons employed.
Contextualizing the football-related violence 
in Brazil
Contrary to the general belief, football violence 
in Brazil is not a recent phenomenon. Although (as 
shown below) the rate of football-related fatalities 
has increased significantly in recent years, accounts 
of violence related to football date back to the 
very inception of the sport in this country. For 
example, at the start of the twentieth century fans 
of football teams in Rio de Janeiro already provoked 
transgressive incidents during their railway travel to 
and from matches in the city’s suburbs. Fuelled by 
the fans’ hostile reception by local residents, fights 
and assaults en route to football matches occurred 
with some regularity. It is important to note that the 
fights were not limited to the suburbs of the city, but 
also reached the clubs of the south of Rio, such as 
Flamengo. In a match in 1923, for example, rowers 
of this club intimidated, threatened and attacked 
Vasco da Gama fans. In the following decades, 
the disturbances continued. In the early 1950s, 
Flamengo fans threw bottles, stones and orange 
peels at the police, after an unexpected defeat by 
the club for Olaria18.
After the 1950s, acts of violence and vandalism 
in Brazilian football began to receive prominent 
coverage in the pages of Jornal dos Esportes, a major 
daily sports newspaper in Rio de Janeiro at the 
time. The paper published a series of reports on 
patron behaviour and the defence of “moralization” 
of football and the application of exemplary 
punishments to violent fansabove18. Although it is 
not possible to assume a direct relationship between 
the public concern about football violence (and its 
concomitant criminalization) and its actual rate or 
frequency, these reports do suggest its existence in the 
past, indicative of which is also the reporting of the 
first fatalities related to fights involving football fans 
in the subsequent decade.
While crowd violence is not a new phenomenon 
in Brazilian football, it was not until the 1980s that 
it came to be more strongly associated – mainly in 
the mass media – with a specific group of spectators: 
the so-called torcidas organizadas5. As we will see 
ahead, these torcidas organizadas (at least in their 
current form) emerged in the late 1960s, when 
Brazil was still living under the weight of the military 
regime and progressed in urban development. 
Most of its members are young15,19 and supported 
by a “periphery” lifestyle20. In the stadia, they are 
concentrated in the stands (often behind the goal) 
and can be easily identified by their clothing (which 
refer to the crowd which they belong) and their own 
chants. As the members of the Hispanic American 
hinchadas and the European ultra groups, organized 
fans usually party more in the stands with their 
musical instruments, banners, flags and pyrotechnic 
devices, besides accompanying the team everywhere 
and fiercely supporting them during matches6.
Another feature of the torcidas organizadas is that 
they operate as an active mechanism of pressure in 
relation to their clubs and federations, promoting, 
for example, boycotts and protests21. Although 
physical violence does not constitute the main aspect 
of the aggregation of these fans, it is a constant 
item in the repertoire of some of them22. According 
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to a survey carried out by Murad19, the fans who 
engage in acts of vandalism and physical violence 
are, however, only a small minority, around 5 
to 7%. This minority, however, usually gets much 
public visibility. According to Toro23, the torcidas 
organizadas tend to become “newsworthy” only 
when linked to urban violence and public disorder.
The association between these fans and violence 
inside and outside the Brazilian stadia became 
particularly established from 1988 onwards, with 
the murder of one of the leading and founding 
members of Mancha-Verdeb, one of the main torcidas 
organizadas of Palmeiras during this period22. In 
the mid-1990s football-related violence gained 
prominence on the media agenda and became 
regulated by political decisions. One episode in 
particular caught the public’s attention: the so-called 
‘war of Pacaembu’, on 20 August 1995. On that day, 
fans of Palmeiras and São Paulo invaded the pitch 
and fought using batons, stones and other objects, 
resulting in the death of a 16-year-old boy as well 
as more than one hundred injuries, including more 
than twenty police officers. Ever since this incident 
various actors – such as politicians, administrators 
and police authorities – have been discussing the 
causes of violence in Brazilian football and proposed 
a raft of control measures.
For example, based on the report of the 
Committee on Peace in Sport24, by the Ministries of 
Sport and of Justice, the Paulista Football Federation 
(Federação Paulista de Futebol, FPF, in Portuguese) 
have implemented, as a pilot project, a series of 
measures for the 2007 Paulista Championship, 
which are still in force until today.
Among other efforts, this report recommended 
that the torcidas organizadas should occupy a 
specific space for them, not allowing, elsewhere 
in the stadium, the movement of fans carrying 
any form of identification of a torcida organizada. 
To enter such spaces, it was defined that the fans 
would have to possess the “fan-card”, obtained 
through their registration at the FPF. In addition, 
the Public Ministry of the State of São Paulo 
determined that all torcidas organizadas in the 
state would have to possess CNPJ (Brazilian 
Register of Legal Entities), having registered 
the statutes of the entity with the notary public, 
having a registry by the FPF, and telling their 
associates to perform the individual registration 
to obtain the “fan-card”. (p. 162)5
At the national level, the most important legal 
instrument of protection and defence of the fan is Law 
No. 10.671/03, better known as Statute of Defence 
of the Fan25. Its entry into force was a milestone in 
the history of sports in the country, after all, “[...] 
although football had already reached the country in 
the form of spectacle and has been for two decades 
one of the most profitable merchandise of capitalism, 
up to 2003 the country had no laws governing the 
promotion of the sport as a spectacle” (p. 98)26. 
Recently, the statute mentioned has suffered some 
alterations. On July 27, 2010, Law No. 12.299/2010 
was sanctioned, which sought to complement it. 
Some of these changes have given rise to severe 
criticism from the leaders of torcidas organizadas. 
Among the arguments, the article that makes these 
torcidas civilly liable for the damage caused by their 
associates to the sporting venues, their immediate 
vicinity or in the round-trip commutes. Basically, the 
criticism is that such article is abusive, given that it 
holds the entire institution responsible for the action 
of some of its members5. This measure, as well as 
the previously mentioned ones, has not been able 
to prevent new conflicts either, as the survey results 
suggest6. Before presenting them, it is necessary, 
however, to present our methodological path.
Method
In many countries, including Brazil, there are 
no reliable incident rates available. Even when such 
databases are available, they tend to be incomplete 
and not directly comparable, due to diverging 
police capacities, definitions and legal categories. 
Measurement, then, is highly problematic in 
assessing the dimensions of the phenomenon. Media 
analysis to establish the extent of fan violence is 
also problematic because it is often unclear whether 
we are measuring actual incidence rates or public 
sensitization to a perceived problem.
This dilemma features prominently in recent 
discussions of English football “hooliganism”. Most 
incidents are not readily visible to the media, since 
they occur away from football grounds. Partly due to 
this, relatively few cases are actually reported in the 
media. According to Dunning27, there has also been 
in England “a media policy of not pointing cameras 
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at incidents inside grounds, a policy based on the 
ostrich-like supposition that, if you do not show and 
directly confront a serious problem, it will somehow 
go away”. In Brazil, we found that television promotes 
the opposite direction, expanding the dimensions 
of violence through sensationalistic treatment17. 
The incidents that occur in the stadia are shown 
remarkably by giving greater visibility to the people 
involved. Nevertheless, such processes of media 
amplification and de-amplification, in combination 
with other measurement problems, make it virtually 
impossible to measure with precision the national or 
international incidence of football-related violence.
Considering these measurement difficulties, and 
in the absence of any systematically collected data 
on the incidence of spectator violence in Brazilian 
football, we will use reported fatalities from 1967c 
to 2012 as an indicator of the scale and intensity of 
spectator violence in Brazilian football. The death 
rate includes fatalities caused by violent behaviour 
in which fans were reported as either the aggressors 
or the victims, or both. We exclude fatalities as 
part of stadia disasters, i.e. those that resulted from 
failures in stadia infrastructures. We also exclude 
the fatalities that, although initially linked by the 
media to football, were, as it was indicated at the 
end by the criminal investigation, motivated by 
other reasons – such as drug trafficking disputes.
The total number of reported fatalities resulting 
from fan violence between 1967 and 2012 was 70. 
This total is based on our content analysis of field 
diaries (written by one of the authors of this articled), 
academic books21,22,28 (which present information 
from different sources, such as direct observation, 
interviews and newspapers), as well as the main 
Brazilian newspapers, magazines, and websites 
for the period 1967-2012e. We investigate, in 
combination, newspapers, magazines and websites 
for two reasons: because of the facility of access (in 
the case of websites) and because of the access to old 
editions (in the case of newspapers and magazines).
In order to reduce this fragility, we consulted the 
Public Ministry of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and 
Goiás, which were willing to help us. We submitted 
a list of names of victims and persons accused of 
homicide (supposedly) related to football in Brazil 
to the prosecutors São Paulo and Goiás. They 
returned to us a new list of victims and persons 
accused, along with the type of crime occurred, 
which allowed us to identify which homicides, 
in fact, were related to football. Such list was also 
delivered to the journalist of Minas Gerais, and the 
Minas Gerais prosecutor. Such consultation was 
necessary insofar as, based on the aforementioned 
analysis on the amplification process of violence, we 
suspected that the media consulted could assign to 
the football universe deaths arising from external 
conflicts – which turned out to be true.
The three types of patterns we were particularly 
interested in are the frequency of fatalities resulting 
from fan violence, the geographical distribution 
of football-related deaths (the numbers of deaths 
raised in football fan conflicts have been related 
to homicide rates in each region), and changes in 
the scale and intensity of football-related fatalities 
over time. The figures presented here are necessarily 
incomplete and imprecise. They provide, at best, 
a very rough indication of the relative scale and 
intensity of spectator violence in Brazilian football. 
In addition, we also recorded the personal data of 
aggressors and victims (gender, age, club affiliation, 
etc.), the time and location of the incident, and the 
weapons used (if any).
The 70 reported fatalities between 1967 and 2012f 
amount to an average of 1.5 per annum. Although 
worrisome, this number is still significantly lower 
than the count in the adjacent Argentina, considered 
today as the country most affected by the football 
violence problem. According to the official list of 
deaths in Argentine football, drafted by the NGO 
Salvemos al fútbol (http://salvemosalfutbol.org/), 
between 1922, when the first death related to 
football was recorded, and the end of 2012, there 
were 269 deaths, which is a total of 2.9 per year, 
and, between 1967 and 2012, there were 250 deaths, 
which is a total of 5.4 per year. Here, however, 
we must make a methodological clarification: 
this list considers all deaths that had some kind 
of relationship with football in Argentina, that 
is, it includes accidents, the so-called “natural” 
deaths, deaths associated with negligent practices 
within stadia, etc. However, these deadly outcomes 
constitute only a small part of the total deaths, 
approximately 12%1.
The comparison with the United Kingdom is 
difficult, due to the absence of official statistics 
before 1991. Football intelligence reports 
suggest that the death rate in English football is 
generally low, when the football stadia disasters 
at Hillsborough, 1989, and Bradford, 1985, are 
excluded29. Based on intelligence reports and in-
depth empirical research, we would estimate that 
the annual death toll of football fan violence in 
England and Wales was generally higher in the 1970s 
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and 1980s than it is today30. Over the past decade, the 
death rate in Brazilian football has been significantly 
higher than in England and Wales31. This difference 
can be explained in part by the measures taken by 
the British authorities to prevent crowd disorder in 
and around football stadia, the relatively frequent 
use of firearms in clashes among Brazilian fans, the 
more central and more negative role of the police 
in Brazil, and, ultimately, the vastly different social 
and cultural context in which the violence should 
be understood. We will return to these issues further 
on in this article.
Results and Discussion
Historical development and geographical 
distribution of football-related fatalities 
Figure 1 indicates significant variations in 
football-related fatalities over time. In recent years 
the number of fatalities resulting from fan violence 
appears to have increased significantly. Between 1967 
and 2012 the average death rate was 1.5 per annum. 
During the last eleven years, from 2002 to 2012, 
the death toll resulting from football violence was 
considerably higher, reaching 2.8 per annum. This 
conclusion inevitably remains somewhat speculative 
due to potential processes of amplification or de-
amplification in press reporting of fan violence32, 
as changes in reported fatalities may reflect more 
the growing public sensitization to football-related 
violence than an increase in the actual incidence of 
football-related fatalities. It could also be argued 
that restricted media coverage during the military 
dictatorship logically results in under-reporting of 
historical traditions of spectator violence. On the 
other hand, the observed pattern corresponds to the 
increasingly violent and displaced inter-group rivalries 
within the subculture of the torcidas organizadas, 
evidence of which are the growing number of non-




























































FIGURE 1 – Development of reported fatalities resulting from fan violence, 1967-2012 (n = 70).
More than one-third of football-related fatalities 
occurred in the states of São Paulo (35.7%) and 
Rio de Janeiro (20%). 17.1 percent occurred in 
Minas Gerais and 7.1 percent in Bahia. Almost 
all fatal incidents took place in the urban centres 
of these states, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo 
Horizonte respectively, besides two fatalities in the 
city of Campinas (São Paulo).
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FIGURE 2 – Geographical distribution of football-related fatalities, 1967-2012 (n = 70).
An initial, though not entirely satisfactory, 
explanation for these figures can be found at the 
societal level, focusing on the scale and intensity of 
urban violence. In Brazil, the democratic transition 
has resulted in more diffuse and, arguably, more 
widespread forms of violence and human rights 
violations, whereby “it is no longer the opponents of 
an authoritarian regime, but instead a fragmented set 
of actors […] who appear both as perpetrators and 
victims”33. The cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
have become significantly more violent since the 
late 1970s, as have several other parts of the country. 
In Rio, homicide rates tripled during the 1980s, 
slightly decreasing and stabilizing in the 1990s34. 
By 2000 there were a total of 3,135 registered 
homicides in Rio de Janeiro, equivalent to 53.6 per 
100,000 inhabitants. Homicide rates in the city of 
São Paulo tripled from 1980 to 1995, reaching 47.3 
in 199635. The rapid growth in homicides particularly 
affects young males from 15 to 29 years of age, both 
as perpetrators and victims of homicide.
The rise in homicide rates reflects growing rates 
of criminality and especially homicides among 
young men related to drug dealing and firearms 
trafficking36,37. Machado da Silva38 argues that 
the growing organization of human crime, from 
the late 1970s onwards, emerged from the threat to 
physical integrity and private property, represented 
mainly by the convergence of common crime and 
drug offenses. Zaluar39 also associates the increase 
in urban violence with trafficking of illegal drugs 
and firearms, coupled with a warrior ethos of 
manliness, “insensitive to the suffering outside, 
proud of violations made on the body of his rivals, 
now seen as mortal enemies to be destroyed in a war 
without end” (p. 10). The increase in violence in 
the 1980s and 1990s is not simply the product of 
poverty, but of a combination of labour market and 
economic transformations, corruption in the judicial 
and penal systems, and political patronage34,38,40,41.
Although social violence and spectator violence at 
football matches are clearly related, an explanation 
that focuses exclusively on general patterns of violence 
to explain a phenomenon as specific and, by all 
standards, as statistically marginal (when compared 
to general homicide rates) as football-related fatalities, 
is inadequate. For instance, homicide rates increased in 
most Brazilian metropolitan regions during the 1980s, 
and not only in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo 
Horizonte. In fact, these cities are not necessarily the 
most violent areas in the country. In 2003, Rio de 
Janeiro was the seventh city in intentional homicides 
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and São Paulo the fourth34. Vitória had the highest 
homicide rate, though none of the reported football-
related fatalities occurred in this city. Moreover, within 
metropolitan areas violence is unequally distributed, 
with poor neighbourhoods and shantytowns 
experiencing the highest levels of violence42,43. Trends 
in football fan violence do not simply reflect, in any 
direct and straightforward fashion, wider changes in 
criminality and public violence.
In view of this, we need to understand the logic of 
football in Brazil. As we noted in the introduction, 
the fact that there are no deaths in certain places 
of the country does not mean that, in those places, 
there is no violence. On the contrary, Paraná, for 
example, has no record of death; however, it has 
been the scene of several violent clashes involving 
football fans. Perhaps the most emblematic of them 
occurred at the end of 2009, when, outraged by 
the relegation of the club, Coritiba fans destroyed 
part of the facilities of ‘Couto Pereira’ (stadia of 
the club) and invaded the field, confronting the 
police. Outside the stadia, a woman was hit by 
a home-made bomb on her way back to the bus 
home and lost part of her left hand6. However, 
although there are indications that football violence 
has spread throughout the country, the fact that 
deaths are concentrated in a greater number in the 
Brazilian Southeast cannot be neglected. A possible 
explanation for this is that this region has the largest 
share of clubs and, consequently, a greater number 
of games. Another possible explanation (and perhaps 
even more important) is that it houses the most 
popular clubs, with a long history of violent rivalry 
between fans. The Northern region, for example, 
where there is the lowest record of deaths, has few 
clubs of popular appeal. The vast majority of its 
inhabitants root for clubs in the Southeast region, 
such as Corinthians and Flamengo. The state of Pará 
is an exception; it is home of two traditional clubs, 
Remo and Paysandu. In this state was recorded 
precisely the only death in the region. Therefore, 
based on the above, we can say that the geographic 
distribution of deaths is directly related to the 
“weight” of each football club.
More specifically, it is worth considering the 
micro-social processes surrounding the involvement 
of young males in football violence. That said, we 
must address the theme of the subjective formations 
of sociability and conflict in relation to the torcidas 
organizadas in order for us to understand how they 
may be associated to demonstrations of physical 
force and the possession of firearms in Brazilian 
football. In this reasoning, we must also consider, 
as we will demonstrate, the role that agents of social 
control have played in the rise and escalation of 
football violence in Brazil.
Social agents directly implicated in football-
related violence
The vast majority of reported football-related 
fatalities result from inter-fan conflicts (70%) or 
from conflicts between football fans and the police 
(10%), as we indicate in Figure 3. It should be 
noted that in many conflicts members of torcidas 
organizadas were reportedly involved, be it as 
aggressors or as simply victims. So, any explanation 
about football violence in Brazil should therefore 
address the issues regarding the culture and the 
evolution of these groups, putting emphasis on the 














FIGURE 3 – Nature of football violence (n = 70).
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In the eyes of most foreign observers, the rationale 
of torcidas organizadas differs completely from the 
carnivalesque image of Brazilian football. The 
emergence of the more partisan and aggressive 
football fan groups between the 1960s and 1970s 
indicated an important discontinuity in fan traditions. 
The new football fan groups gradually came to 
overshadow the traditional carnaval associations, 
known as Charangas (the term Charanga refers to 
the music support groups that existed at the stadia). 
The Charangas emerged during the early 1940sg, and 
they consisted of groups of friends who put on team-
related coloured clothes and played amusing music 
and carnaval marches (“marchinhas”) in support of 
their football team. Similar to the current torcidas 
organizadas, these groups of friends were responsible 
for organizing shows in the stands in advance. 
They also followed their team so as to support it 
everywhere. Nevertheless, the group’s identification 
was mainly towards their team, never towards the 
group itself. In addition, the Charangas were closely 
linked to the figure of “symbol fans”, who represented 
the entire fandom. These fans tended to be “socially 
settled”, since they were aged between thirty and 
forty and were generally lauded by the media and by 
football authorities by virtue of being an enthusiastic 
fandom and offering positive atmosphere during the 
matches. Most Charangas did involve themselves 
in team affairs, without having any animosity with 
the team directors. Very frequently, groups also 
received financial or logistical support from football 
team directors so as for them to entertain teams and 
their fans44,45.
The social function of the Charangas was contested 
by the newly established torcidas organizadas, which 
rejected their fandom practices due to its alleged 
“peacefulness” and “intimacy” towards football 
teams and football politics. In this viewpoint, the 
Charangas were thus too dependent on teams and 
were considered to behave uncritically in relation 
to them. One of the first torcidas organizadas, the 
Gaviões da Fiel (literally, the “Loyal Hawks”), was 
established at the São Paulo-based football team 
Corinthians in 1969. This group was created to 
oppose the elite committee that had been managing 
the club, and during its creation, the purpose was 
instead to promote fans’ rights. Its conception should 
be viewed within the broader social context from late 
1960s and early 1970s. At a time when human rights 
and civil rights were seriously limited by dictatorial 
rule, football provided one of the few occasions in 
which Brazilians could give vent to their political 
voice. In groups such as Gaviões da Fiel, people 
having few civil rights could stand up for their rights 
as mere fans, what immediately made them socially 
visible. Also in this context, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the group holds a reputation for occasionally 
intimidating players and club officials who are seen 
as performing substandard46.
Historically, Gaviões da Fiel was one of the first 
torcidas organizadas that adopted a more formalized 
organizational structure21,45. This structure included 
the roles of president and vice-president, directors 
and advisors. It established an agenda for periodical 
elections, and administratively it functioned as a 
non-profit organization. Today Gaviões da Fiel 
remains highly influential. It has around 100,000 
members and it also has its own samba schools. It is 
worth remembering that similar groups of fanatical 
supporters have also been created throughout 
Brazil. Very importantly, they have been largely 
inspiring themselves on the fan model established 
by Gaviões da Fiel. Currently, many of the bigger 
football teams in Brazil have multiple and largely 
autonomous torcidas organizadas. For example, we 
can distinguish at least eight different fan groups at 
the Rio de Janeiro team Vasco da Gama.
The de jure democratization of Brazil in the 
mid-1980s did not lead to a decline in the 
number of the torcidas organizadas. During the 
early 1990s the membership of many torcidas 
organizadas grew rapidly. For instance, in 1991 
the fan groups Gaviões da Fiel, Independente 
and Mancha Verde had 12,000, 7,000 and 4,000 
affiliates, respectively. By the end of 1995, they had 
respectively 46,000, 28,000 and 18,000 members20. 
Furthermore, the torcidas organizadas are 
predominantly a male affair, since approximately 90 
percent of affiliates of the bigger torcidas organizadas 
are (young) males. This situation is reflected in the 
number of fatalities resulting from fan violence: all 
reported aggressors and victims were males, and 
the vast majority were young males. FIGURE 4 
shows the number of fatalities by age.
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FIGURE 4 – Football-related fatalities by age.
From the 1990s onwards, the rapid expansion 
of the torcidas organizadas was accompanied by an 
increase in the rate of violence. Many of the new 
affiliates were young men aged between 12 and 18, 
who were allured by the lifestyle and symbolic capital 
that the torcidas organizadas offered them. In view 
of the crisis of representativeness of traditional 
institutions – such as political parties and labour 
unions – the torcidas organizadas have become an 
important source of identity, meaning and visibility 
for thousands of young men, who also consider them 
important forms of leisure and participation in the 
universe of the professional football. Nonetheless, 
belonging to a torcida organizada is not only limited 
to the simple formal affiliation. From the reflections 
by Moreira47 and Zucal2 on the Argentinean 
hinchadas, we can infer that for a new fan to be 
known, recognized, and thus respected by other 
fans, he must be fully committed to his team. He 
will have to follow the club everywhere, to always 
support the team and players (especially, in times of 
adversity), to travel with fans to away matches, to 
attend the headquarters of the club, to participate 
in the everyday and invisible “work” so as to win the 
symbolic battle against the rival fans, and, logically, 
to honour his crowd.
In this context, denying the physical support to 
the team or not putting his own life at risk in the 
name of the torcida organizada symbolizes a quite 
questionable attitude, that is, an object of shame. 
Yet it does not happen only for the one who deserted 
the conflict. As a rock that falls into the water, the 
humiliation, here, has a ripple effect, which follows 
from the fugitive to the entire crowd, as it were a kind 
of symbolic contamination. As Moreira47 states, the 
humiliation of a member of the torcida organizada 
stains the very honour of the other affiliates.
Given that, physical and verbal aggression has 
turned into an important code of conduct in the 
eyes of the members of the torcidas organizadas. In 
Argentina, for example, physical confrontations with 
rival fans or against the police constitute a form of 
action performed by some fans. By doing that, they 
can demonstrate that they possess “aguante”, i.e., the 
capacity to resist pain48. The display of this capacity 
confers them honour and prestige within their 
group (hinchada). In this case, there exists a strong 
association between violence and masculinity, which 
rests on the logic of aguante49. In Brazil, the torcidas 
organizadas are guided by a principle of masculinity 
quite similar to the Argentinean one20,50. Therefore, 
we can infer that the engagement of some fans in 
violent actions can be determined by this association.
In the early 1990s, explosives and firearms 
became to be much more used by the crowds, what 
contributed to the appearance of violent incidents 
286 • Rev Bras Educ Fís Esporte, (São Paulo) 2019 Abr-Jun;33(2):277-92
Reis HHB, et al. 
in Brazilian football. In addition, confrontations 
between rival fan groups gradually became more 
organized and premeditated. At the same time, 
some torcidas organizadas, including Gaviões 
da Fiel, overtly distanced themselves from the 
violent events initiated by some of their members. 
Instead they emphasized the positive function they 
were supposed to have in Brazilian societyh. It is 
important to note here that the occurrence of violent 
confrontations should not be interpreted as a sign 
by which the torcidas organizadas have necessarily 
been synonymous with violence, as if violence were 
inherent to their appearance. Put differently, not 
every member of a torcidas organizada engages in 
violent behaviour. Similarly, the fandom cannot 
be held responsible for the violence associated 
with torcidas organizadas. In fact, as some studies 
indicate7, only a minority of these fans have been 
implicated in violence. Additionally, the violent 
actions displayed by football fans (whether 
associated with torcidas organizadas or not) are 
not uniform. Rather, they may represent different 
degrees and types of violence (e.g. physical or 
symbolic violence).
In general, the role of the police and private 
security organizations is much more central and 
much more negative in Latin America than in 
most Western countries. In several Latin American 
societies, the police have a long history of violence 
against citizens, which has often been displayed on 
behalf of a repressive state51, leading also to extra-
legal repression in the form of “death squads”52 or 
“police bandits”41. In the context of football, this 
role has remained most obvious in the fatalities 
resulting directly from bullets fired by police officers. 
Seven of the 70 reported fatalities (10%) are in this 
category. Moreover, concerning the people killed and 
wounded directly by police gunfire, Alabarces48 
affirms that “one needs to add the systematically 
violent conduct of police in relation to match 
security” (p. 35). Besides the image of a hostile 
police force, there is the fact that the police has 
unwillingly accepted to take on responsibility for 
football events, since security for football matches 
is considered a “private matter” by Brazilian police 
forces. By explaining inter-fan violence in terms of 
crowd pathology, the police’s perceptions of football 
fans remove the role of the police in producing 
collective conflict. The rationale of the crowd and 
its internal dynamics may be considered as sufficient 
explanations in themselves53. In view of that, football 
fans must be always strictly controlled, especially 
considering the perceived “violent minority” of the 
torcidas organizadas.
This perception of the police’s role is problematic, 
as it minimizes the heterogeneousness behind the 
composition of football crowds, as well as the 
diverging attitudes towards the use of violence among 
its members, reducing them to a one-dimensional 
stereotype alone. Furthermore, it may profoundly 
influence fan attitudes towards the police. The 
torcedores organizados – the fanatic supporters of the 
organized groups – generally perceive the police as 
an ineffective, indiscriminately aggressive, unreliable 
and corrupt organization. It should be said that 
police strategies at football matches are mostly 
reactive and repressive, rather than being proactive 
and preventive practices9, which would rely mainly 
on forceful intervention that may escalate collective 
conflict, instead of inhibiting it.
This style of policing, together with the public 
perception thereof, is not particular to football 
matches. Yet it is part of a broader pattern of 
using the police as a force to maintain social order, 
rather than a force aimed to providing security or 
investigating crimes54,55. The forces of law and order 
have been themselves one of the main agents of 
violence in many Brazilian cities34. Several police 
forces in Brazil are plagued by corruption, entangled 
with organized crime, and thus accustomed to 
violent and illegal methods of action41,51,56. Many 
Brazilians do not consider the police in terms of 
law, rights, and citizenship, but rather as a corrupt 
and immoral institution34. This perception resides 
in a long history of state disrespect for civil rights 
and in a deep disbelief in the fairness of the justice 
system, including its ability to function without 
bias57. Police abuses often go unpunished, which 
reflects the principle of impunity, a central feature 
of Brazilian society33,36.
Locations of incidents and weapons used in 
football-related fatalities
As noted above, the evolution of football violence 
in Brazil should also be understood in light of the 
role played by agents of social control. An important 
element referring to this role is the intended 
and unanticipated effects of counter-measures 
aimed at containing crowd behaviour during 
professional football matches in Brazil. Following 
the rise in football-related violence from the 1990s 
onwards, state authorities started to introduce several 
“counter-measures”: the CCTV; the introduction 
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of compulsory identity cards for affiliates of torcidas 
organizadas; and the gradual modernization of 
football stadia. Nationally, the most important legal 
instrument to fight football violence is the Estatuto de 
Defesa do Torcedor (Federal Act 10.671/03) [“Sports 
Fan Statute”, in English]. In short, counter-measures 
have had some impact on the incidence of spectator 
violence inside football stadia in Brazil, at least in 
the short and in the medium term 913.
At the same time, anti-violence policies have 
displaced and transformed football violence to a 
great extent, instead of effectively reducing it over 
the years. Inter-fans conflicts have increasingly 
been moved into areas where controls are or are 
perceived by fans as being weak or even non-existent. 
Confrontations between rival fans are more and 
more organized and they often take place outside 
and away from the stadia, such as in surrounding 
streets, in public transport and at subway stations 
or at bus stations. Encounters are sometimes pre-
arranged via mobile phones or using the internet.
Some inter-group rivalries have also been 
reproduced at basketball matches and during samba 
festivals. The most notorious incident occurred 
during the São Paulo carnaval in February 2003. 
A 25-year-old man was shot straight in the head 
during a clash between São Paulo fans affiliated to 
the Torcida Tricolor Independente, together with 
members of the torcida organizada, and samba school 
Pavilhão9, which is associated with Corinthians. The 
incident occurred at the Anhembi Sambrome in the 
city of São Paulo. Later on, a fight broke out between 
members of Independente and the Palmeiras’ torcida 
organizada “Mancha Alviverde”. In the end, two 
people were beaten to death58.
The use of firearms is quite evident in reported 
football-related fatalities in Brazil. FIGURE 5 shows 
that, on average, 53% of deaths were caused by 
gunfire. In addition to these fatalities, there are 
several other recorded cases of inter-fan conflict 
involving guns. The use of firearms in football-related 
violence has been considerably more common in 
Brazil than in Western Europe, where inter-fan 
confrontations usually involve fist fighting, knives, 
bottles or sticks. In fact, using firearms in football-
related violence is extremely rare Western Europe29. 
Frosdick and Newton31 state that in England and 
Wales “the most likely use of weapons would seem 
to be the throwing of missiles such as bottles in the 
general direction of opposing fans or the police. 
Such missiles generally land on the ground and so 
are unlikely to result in injury”.
This striking cross-national difference can 
be explained by examining the issue of firearms 
possession in the Brazilian society. Both registered and 
unlawful gun possession has increased significantly 
since Brazil’s democratic transition and it may be 
closely related to the rise in drug-related crime, 
the expansion of private security and the feeling 
of power that the gun gives to men who use it as a 
tool for the exercise of power59. The delegitimation 
of the rule of law along Brazilian social classes has 
led Brazilians to increasingly take the responsibility 
for their defence and personal safety, by using their 
own hands34. The increase in the number of gun 
possession licenses associates with the fact that a 
higher proportion of homicides are performed with 
personal guns. Today, Brazil is the country having 
the highest rate of firearm involvement in homicides. 
Almost 70% of all homicides involve a firearm. The 
relative ease by which firearms can be possessed in 
Brazil remains a particular concern.
An alternative explanation is that moral 
assessments and the meanings ascribed to football 
violence may be changing. Here, data from the 
Argentinean case can help us again. In this country, 
the number of deaths involving fans committed by 
firearms increased significantly in the 1990s, and 
it has increased even further in recent years1. This 
increase appears to be associated to the new social 
status that the use of firearms has had. According to 
Moreira47, the former members of the Argentinean 
hinchadas condemned (at least, discursively) the 
use of such weapons. In order for hinchas to show 
aguante, it was necessary to face the rival fans through 
physical confrontation. The use of firearms was not 
considered legitimate for this purpose. It would only 
be justified in two instances: to defend the patrimony 
of the crowd (such as flags and banners) and as a 
last resort to defend one’s life – e.g., in case a fan is 
ambushed by various rival fans. Nowadays, physical 
confrontation remains still the most legitimate way 
to show aguante. However, using firearms in inter-fan 
conflicts is also a practice of the struggle to achieve 
symbolic capital. Therefore, the use of guns does 
not put in question their “masculinity”.
In Brazil, conflicts with firearms also seem to be 
very controversial. In 2012, for example, fans from 
Palmeiras and Corinthians embarked on inter-fan 
confrontation some hours local derby, along an avenue 
in the Northern barrio of São Paulo. Two Palmeiras 
fans were shot and killed. In the next game between 
these clubs, the ‘Mancha Alviverde’ from Palmeiras 
took banners to the stadia in order to draw a huge 
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mosaic in protest against the use of firearms. More 
than a message for peace, the mosaic was a claim 
that inter-fan conflicts should be conducted through 
physical confrontation. An example of this claim is 
that while exhibiting such mosaic, Palmeiras’s fans 
addressed songs to Corinthians’ fans inviting them to 
fight “hand-to-hand”. Nevertheless, we need further 
studies to investigate if a change of attitude regarding 
the use of firearms by the most violent sectors of the 














FIGURE 5 – Use of weapons (n = 70).
By analysing the football-related fatalities in 
Brazil, the purpose of the study was to describe 
and analyse the extent and the nature of deaths 
related to the football scene in Brazil. As we 
suggested here, fatalities constitute only one 
factor among several other variables that must 
be considered. Separately, our results can lead to 
misinterpretations, as the belief according to which 
there existed no case of physical violence in the 
Brazilian football before 1967. For this reason, 
our purpose here was to indicate some historical 
studies that could complement our current analysis, 
in order to avoid misunderstandings. Although 
partial and incomplete, the journalistic sources 
of these studies reveal the existence of conflicts 
already in the early twentieth century. Recognizing 
the limitations of our work, we consider that it 
can help relevant social agents by offering them an 
opportunity to develop and to rethink on security 
policies in sports. First of all, these actors need to 
consider that today many inter-fan confrontations 
take place away from the stadia, featuring a type 
of organization that requires a refocusing of police 
functions in relation to intelligence. It should also 
be noted that a significant proportion of football-
related fatalities are caused by the use of firearms, 
a fact that suggests the need for greater rigor for 
the authorities to control access to guns.
In addition, it is worth remembering that 
aggressive or disproportionate actions by police 
forces can increase – rather than diminish – 
violence among spectators. This suggests that 
greater police specialization and education 
is required in order to promote a paradigm 
change when dealing with football fans. The 
pathologization of spectator behaviour – as if it 
were irrational and violent by definition – has only 
served to legitimize and fuel repressive and violent 
measures against football spectators whose civil 
liberties may often be not safeguarded. Finally, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that, despite 
the persistence of football-related violence, the 
vast majority of football fans are non-violent, and 
the torcidas organizadas in which they participate 
are an important source of identity, leisure and 
political participation for thousands of young 
people. Organized groups of football fans are 
citizens and should be treated as such. In this 
respect, we would advocate the establishment 
of new strategies of engagement and dialogue 
with fans, instead of further amplifying the legal 
control measures and the penalization targeted at 
them. To promote the pacification of Brazilian 
football, we should not accept measures that may 
contribute to the criminalization, discrimination 
and exclusion of any social group.
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Resumo
Dor e sofrimento no futebol: análise de fatalidades relacionadas ao futebol no Brasil
Neste artigo, objetivamos descrever e analisar a extensão e a natureza das mortes relacionados ao espetáculo 
de futebol no Brasil. Para isso, utilizamos e cruzamos dados de diferentes fontes – pesquisa de campo, livros 
acadêmicos, relatórios do Ministério da Justiça e sites de associações de segurança e de grandes revistas 
e jornais brasileiros – entre 1967-2012. Concluímos que a distribuição geográfica dessas mortes está 
diretamente relacionada ao “peso” de cada região brasileira. Observamos também que a maioria dessas 
mortes se originou de confrontos entre torcedores e em conflitos com a polícia, causados pela adoção de 
estratégias reativas e repressivas pela polícia. Além disso, ressaltamos que muitas das mortes ocorreram 
fora dos estádios e envolveram o uso de armas de fogo, como resultado do fácil acesso a essas armas e, 
possivelmente, por uma mudança de atitude dos grupos mais violentos quanto ao seu uso.
Palavras-chave: Violência; Futebol; Mortes; Torcidas organizadas.
Notes
a. A rare exception is the research that raised the deaths of Brazilian football fans between 1999 and 20088. Another exception 
is the study carried out by Nery4, which raised the number of deaths in Brazilian football between 1992 and March 2012. 
Our survey, however, differs from these two. First, because we analyse a much larger period of time. Second, because the 
methodology used was different. Nery, for example, is limited to the analysis of materials published in the media. As we will 
see ahead, from our point of view, this can be a problem. Because of this, we also use other sources. Moreover, we want to 
point out that many of the issues discussed herein are also unpublished, such as the one related to moral disputes about the 
use of firearms in the Brazilian context.
b. Mancha-Verde became defunct in 1995 after some of its members entered into conflict with members of Torcida Independente, 
of São Paulo. In 1997, the fan group was re-established as Mancha Alviverde5.
c. Our decision to work within this specific period was informed by the fact that 1967 was the first year in which a football-
related fatality was reported in Brazil.
d. These were made between the years of 1994 and 1998 – the stadia ‘Brinco de Ouro da Princesa’ (Campinas, SP), ‘Parque 
Antártica’ (São Paulo, SP), ‘Vila Belmiro’ (Santos, SP); ‘Morumbi’ (São Paulo, SP); ‘Pacaembu’ (São Paulo, SP) between 2007 
and 2009 during the Brazilian Football Championship and the Brazil Cup.
e. The sites analysed are: O Estado de S. Paulo (http://www.estadao.com.br/); Folha de S.Paulo (www.folha.uol.com.br); O 
Globo (http://oglobo.globo.com/); Jornal do Brasil (http://www.jb.com.br/); Agora São Paulo (http://www.agora.uol.com.
br/); ISTOÉ (http://www.istoe.com.br/capa); UOL (www.uol.com.br); Globo (www.globo.com); Terra (http://www.terra.
com.br/portal/); SaferNet (http://www.safernet.org.br/site/); AchaNotícias (http://www.achanoticias.com.br/); Globo Esporte 
(http://globoesporte.globo.com/); Hoje em Dia (http://www.hojeemdia.com.br/); Jornal Opção (http://www.jornalopcao.
com.br/) and Lance!Net (http://www.lancenet.com.br/). In order to facilitate the information search on football-related 
fatalities on these sites, we used the available search engines. The search terms and descriptors used in these search engines 
varied according to the organization of each system.
f. Twenty-seven of those deaths, according to our findings, are of members of torcidas organizadas. Seven of them were under 
age (between 15 and 17 years); four had unidentified age in the reports and sixteen were aged between 19 and 31 years, with 
five of these being 19 years old, age at which there is a higher incidence of fatalities among the dead members belonging to 
torcidas organizadas.
g. Here, it is important to note that during the same period some fan groups had also emerged in the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
and some groups had already called themselves as “torcidas organizadas”. In the city of São Paulo, some groups had preferred 
to name themselves “torcidas uniformizadas”. However, these groups resembled more the Charangas than the current torcidas 
organizadas do today44.
h. One of the differences between the torcidas organizadas and the British hooligans resides precisely in the fact that the torcidas 
organizadas do not stand out by their deliberate transgression or by the anonymity, even if some of their actions follow this 
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path. On the contrary, the torcidas organizadas seek generally to be recognized as representative and legitimate institutions of 
their teams. In addition, unlike the hooligans, most of these fans embody a legal entity, with directors, deliberative council 
and periodic elections for President. This entity also has links to the other torcidas organizadas. These links are not limited 
to strategic alliances against the opponents. Yet they aim at the exchange of travel support and infrastructure. It has its own 
headquarters, where barbecues, parties and meetings are promoted. It provides flags, musical instruments, pyrotechnical artifacts 
and its members wear clothes that identify them as fans. Finally, the torcida organizada has no ties with extreme right-wing 
parties and/or ideological nationalist projects (though it is important to note that many hooligans also do not have them)5,21.
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